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Abstract 
Research summary: We examine how board members' reactions following financial misconduct differ from those 
following other adverse organizational events, such as poor performance. We hypothesize that inside directors and 
directors appointed by the CEO may be particularly concerned about their reputation following deceptive 
financial practices. We demonstrate that directors more closely affiliated with the CEO are more likely to reduce 
their support for the CEO following financial misconduct, increasing the likelihood of CEO replacement. 
Enactment of the Sarbanes‐Oxley Act similarly alters governance dynamics by creating a greater expectation for 
sound corporate governance. We demonstrate our findings in U.S. public firms that restated their financial 
earnings during a 12‐year period before and after the passage of Sarbanes‐Oxley. 
 
Managerial summary: Given past concerns about lack of oversight by boards of directors leading to firm financial 
misconduct, we examine how the relationship between directors and CEOs may be altered in the face of such 
misconduct. We argue that directors most closely tied to the CEO (inside board members and board members 
appointed by the CEO), typically the most supportive of the CEO, may become most concerned about their own 
reputation following financial misconduct. We find that CEOs receive less support from these directors, a finding 
in contrast to past studies demonstrating that such board members tend to shield CEOs following poor 
performance. These findings are accentuated following the passage of the Sarbanes‐Oxley Act, which places 
greater responsibility on the CEO for the accuracy of financial reports. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Scandals at Enron, Fannie Mae, WorldCom, Adelphia Communications, and other firms underscore the 
prevalence with which managers manipulate and misrepresent the material positions of their organizations for 
their own gain. Despite calls for stiff penalties and clear consequences for financial fraud and misrepresentation, 
recent research has noted that executives in charge of these firms often bear little direct personal cost for financial 
fraud while shareholders amass large losses (Burks, 2010; Flanagan, Muse, and O'Shaughnessy, 2008). A Fortune 
magazine cover story on white‐collar crime titled “They Lie, They Cheat, They Steal and They've been Getting 
Away with It for Too Long” (Leaf, 2002: 84) argued that managers in firms that engage in fraudulent financial 
reporting and misrepresentation face few negative repercussions for their actions. This consistent lack of 
meaningful sanction following financial misrepresentation has both raised questions as to whether firm 
governance structures are effective in deterring managerial misconduct and disciplining illegal behavior and 
increased calls for more serious oversight of financial misconduct (Dash, 2010). As Aguilera and Jackson (2010: 
534) noted: “While the origins of the financial crisis are a topic of great complexity, it is legitimate to ask what 
role corporate governance has played, if any?” Much of the motivation for the enactment of Sarbanes‐Oxley 
legislation in 2002 (hereafter, SOX, 2002), for example, was to prevent further occurrence of financial fraud and 
increase expectations for sound corporate governance (Burks, 2010; Flanagan et al., 2008).  
Past research has examined the antecedents and consequences of questionable and potentially unethical business 
practices as they affect individuals and organizations (Greve, Palmer, and Pozner, 2010; Hirsch and Pozner, 
2005). Research focused specifically on financial misrepresentation has argued that deceptive actions by firms can 
stigmatize organizational members (Devers et al., 2009; Link and Phelan, 2001; Wiesenfeld, Wurthmann, and 
Hambrick, 2008) and that such stigma may arise when a firm's illegitimate actions cause stakeholders to form a 
collective perception that the organization and its members are deeply flawed and discredited (Link and Phelan, 
2001; Wiesenfeld et al., 2008). Financial fraud and misrepresentation can trigger these attributions, so that those 
seeking to assign blame for the misconduct often transfer their attributions of stigma and blame to individuals 
associated with the organization (Rider, Negro, and Roberts, 2011; Semadeni et al., 2008), thus affecting the 
reputation of those individuals.  
However, researchers' understanding of whether and how financial misrepresentation might influence the 
relationship between board members and the CEO remains limited. Specifically, past studies have not examined 
whether inside board members and those appointed by the current CEO (hereafter, appointed board members)—
that is, those who are presumed to be more loyal to the chief executive—may tend to minimize the significance of 
financial misconduct and protect the CEO as predicted by agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), or whether 
they might take actions to protect their own reputations and the perceived legitimacy of the board (Cowen and 
Marcel, 2011; Suchman, 1995). To the extent that board members are concerned for their own reputation 
following disclosure of the firm's financial misconduct, then the passage of legal and regulatory remedies such as 
SOX, specifically aimed at preventing financial fraud and poor corporate governance, might instead prompt these 
board members to distance themselves from the CEO. Although the potential ramifications of SOX as an 
institutional intervention influencing subsequent board behaviors has been highlighted in the literature, the 
importance of understanding its effect has been little studied (Pfarrer et al., 2008b; Withers, Hillman, and 
Cannella, 2012). This dearth is also reflected in the limited amount of research focused on investigating the effect 
of institutional changes on corporate governance (Aguilera and Jackson, 2010; Westphal and Zajac, 2013).  
Drawing from concepts that help explain and extend our understanding of the actions of board members, such as 
stigma by association, this study examines how key aspects of the governance process, including board affiliation 
and regulatory intervention, influence the probability of chief executive replacement following financial 
misconduct. These behaviorally‐based perspectives can help better explain outcomes that may differ from those 
suggested by under‐socialized governance theories, especially agency theory (Dalton et al., 2007; Westphal and 
Zajac, 2013). We hypothesize that financial misrepresentation and the passage of SOX may each alter the 
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customary relationship between the CEO and inside and appointed board members—particularly the tendency of 
inside and appointed board members to reduce the probability of CEO replacement.  
We study financial misrepresentation because it represents a visible, specific form of organizational misconduct 
that has the clear potential to stigmatize members of the board of directors of an organization (Desai, Hogan, and 
Wilkins, 2006; Devers et al., 2009; Flanagan et al., 2008; Karpoff, Lee, and Martin, 2008). This study thus offers 
an opportunity to examine the interplay between individual self‐interest on the part of board members as well as 
normative assumptions surrounding their fiduciary role in the oversight and monitoring of the firm. Specifically, 
our study examines financial misrepresentation that occurs when firms are found to have misrepresented their 
earnings and are subsequently required to restate their financial position, thereby acknowledging that financial 
misrepresentation has occurred (Flanagan et al., 2008; U.S. GAO, 2002, 2006). Recent research focused on top 
management and board changes (Arthaud‐Day et al., 2006; Gomulya and Boeker, 2014; Harris and Bromiley, 
2007) has investigated the consequences of restatements for organizations but not the research question that we 
ask here, which centers on how the relationship between inside and appointed board members and their chief 
executive may be altered by a reputation‐damaging event as well as how this effect may vary before and after a 
regulatory change. We examine these questions in the context of public firms in the United States over a 12‐year 
period from 1995 to 2006, prior to and following the enactment of SOX.  
Our results first confirm past findings from agency‐ and corporate‐governance research that, under typical 
conditions, a greater proportion of inside and appointed board members reduces the probability of CEO 
replacement (Deutsch, 2005). However, following an earnings restatement, the support for the CEO from inside 
and appointed board members weakens significantly and this weakening effect also occurs following the passage 
of SOX. These findings suggest that, following events that could challenge the legitimacy of the firm's 
governance structure, inside and appointed board members may be more concerned about how they are perceived, 
and as suggested by the concept of stigma by association, such directors may prefer to distance themselves from 
the CEO. The main contributions of this study include highlighting and reinforcing the growing notion that the 
effects of corporate governance may actually be more nuanced, and are critically contingent on specific factors 
inside and outside the firm (Aguilera et al., 2008; Dalton et al., 2007). Our study points to the manner in which 
the use of various well‐established concepts such as stigma by association and legitimacy can complement the 
predominant agency view of firm governance.  
 
THEORY 
As an illegitimate action that violates institutionalized norms and values in society, financial misrepresentation 
can stigmatize a firm and its members, causing stakeholders and outside observers to perceive the focal firm as 
unsound and discredited (Arthaud‐Day et al., 2006; Devers et al., 2009; Harris and Bromiley, 2007; Link and 
Phelan, 2001; Wiesenfeld et al., 2008). Misrepresentation of the financial position of the firm both fractures 
shared societal norms that hold deception as unacceptable (Tetlock, 2002) and undermines the trust of the public 
and investors. Financial misconduct stigmatizes top managers of the firm because stakeholders perceive that the 
firm's top management has substantial control and a considerable role in the financial misrepresentation (Devers 
et al., 2009). This perception of controllability is a product of the belief that fraud requires a conscious decision 
by individuals within the organization to purposely mislead shareholders and other organizational stakeholders. 
Individuals within the organization are seen to have made calculated, intentional decisions to provide misleading 
financial information that incorrectly portrays the material financial condition of the firm. Misrepresentations of 
financial information involve intentional decisions to mislead investors and the public (Agrawal, Jaffe, and 
Karpoff, 1999), and can often be traced to specific actors within the firm, thus providing highly visible targets for 
blame.  
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When a firm experiences a scandal, stakeholders outside the firm want to understand what happened. Because the 
firm's top managers and executives are seen as directly responsible for restatements, the removal of these leaders 
may aid in the firm's recovery process (Devers et al., 2009; Wiesenfeld et al., 2008). While outside observers may 
feel that the entire top management of a firm is to some extent responsible, specific blame is most likely to be 
directed toward organizational members in charge of the firm (Wiesenfeld et al., 2008) since individuals who 
occupy higher status positions are likely to attract more attention and represent more salient targets for blame 
(Fiske, 1980). Recent work by Graffin et al. (2013) demonstrated that high‐status individuals face more scrutiny 
and are held to higher standards of conduct, and that observers consider the same misconduct as more deliberate 
when committed by elites. Similarly, Fragale et al. (2009) argued that audiences assume that the behaviors of 
high‐status individuals are more intentional, and Giordano (1983) has argued that elites are held to higher 
standards so that even relatively small violations of norms result in heightened expectations of accountability for 
their behaviors. Since the CEO is the most important material and symbolic representative of the organization—
and has been viewed in past studies as having the greatest responsibility and authority for the firm's actions 
(Carpenter, Geletkanycz, and Sanders, 2004)—it is likely that the CEO will be held responsible for the occurrence 
of a financial restatement and may be replaced as a result.  
Stigma by association 
Researchers have demonstrated evidence of stigma transfer or “stigma by association” (Kulik, Bainbridge, and 
Cregan, 2008; Neuberg et al., 1994) through which ties to stigmatized actors may also stigmatize others. 
Goffman's (1963) original description of stigma by association characterized it as a taint afflicting those 
associated with stigmatized individuals. Studies of individual stigma have demonstrated that even arbitrary 
associations can transfer stigma—for example, sitting next to an obese person can result in lower expectations as 
to whether a candidate would be acceptable for a job (Hebl and Mannix, 2003). Work by Pontikes, Negro, and 
Rao (2010) on the blacklisting of actors, directors, and screenwriters during the “Red Scare” in Hollywood from 
1945 to 1960 demonstrated how stigma can be transferred through the mere association with a stigmatized 
individual and that such association can limit the ability of the focal individual to find future employment. 
Evidence of stigma by association can also be observed at the organizational level, where research has shown that 
firms linked to organizations filing bankruptcy (Gove and Janney, 2004) or firms in the same industry in which 
other firms are restating earnings (Da Dalt and Margetis, 2004) experience negative market reactions.  
Greve et al. (2010) argued that illegitimate organizational actions can be thought to create a stain that can threaten 
the identity of organizational members. In this manner, stigma can be transferred from organizations to 
individuals within the organization (Wiesenfeld et al., 2008), and past work has described how the stigmatization 
created by financial misrepresentation can spread from the firm to its employees, damaging their reputation and 
value in the external labor market (Collins et al., 2009; Fama, 1980; Semadeni et al., 2008). When violations of 
norms or rules are seen as more directly attributable to specific individuals, they are likely to be stigmatized, thus 
restricting the stigma to these individuals and helping buffer the identity of the firm and its members (Pozner, 
2008). In the case of financial misrepresentation, those seeking to assign blame for the organization's problems 
may shift stigmatization from the overall organization to the top managers responsible for running the firm 
(Elsbach, 2006; Wiesenfeld et al., 2008). In more extreme cases, this form of stigma by association may also 
spread to other members of the organization. Employees at all levels of Enron, for example, have probably 
experienced some degree of stigmatization from their association with the firm, and past studies have 
demonstrated that individuals who cite Enron on their resumes may elicit negative associations for potential 
employers, clients, and executive recruiters (Anders, 2004).  
Board independence 
Past studies have demonstrated that board independence has a key influence on whether the board is likely to 
protect or replace the CEO (Finkelstein, Hambrick, and Cannella, 2009). Board independence has been argued to 
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depend on the extent to which board members are outside directors (Fama and Jensen, 1983) and whether they 
have been appointed by the current CEO (Park, Westphal, and Stern, 2011). Past empirical studies have generally 
confirmed that boards with more members appointed by the current CEO or more inside members are likely to 
protect and buffer the CEO from replacement or dismissal (Deutsch, 2005; Finkelstein et al., 2009; Krause and 
Semadeni, 2014). Particularly in cases where the firm is facing competitive challenges, such as poor performance, 
appointed or inside board members can act to protect the CEO from replacement by attributing blame for the 
firm's problems to the external environment, changes in regulation, or changes in competitive conditions.  
We argue that such a relationship may work very differently in cases involving events such as financial 
misconduct. Unlike in the case of poor firm performance, the potentially fraudulent nature of financial 
misrepresentation requires deliberate intent by the members of top management to engage in illicit actions 
(Devers et al., 2009)—something that is more difficult for inside and appointed board members to discount or 
ignore. Misrepresentation of the financial condition of the firm, and subsequent requirements by the Security 
Exchange Commission (SEC) to restate earnings, may directly compromise the reputation of the board of 
directors, since these actions indicate that the board may have failed to fulfill its monitoring and oversight 
responsibilities.  
Appointed board members and CEO replacement 
Board members appointed by the current CEO have been viewed in past research as loyal to the chief executive, 
with these loyalties and personal ties limiting their ability to act independently (Fredrickson, Hambrick, and 
Baumrin, 1988). Board members appointed by the CEO are likely to be those whom the chief executive feels 
comfortable working with, explicitly approves of, and holds in high regard, feelings that are likely reciprocated 
(Boeker, 1992; Wade, O'Reilly, and Chandratat, 1990). Past studies have demonstrated that chief executives face 
a much lower likelihood of replacement or termination in cases where there is a greater number or proportion of 
the board appointed by the current CEO (Finkelstein et al., 2009). Empirical work examining the replacement of 
the CEO has demonstrated how these “loyal” board members are especially reluctant to replace the chief 
executive who appointed them since the appointment itself served as a signal of confidence, affiliation, and trust 
on the part of the CEO (Park et al., 2011).  
Given their likely loyalty to the CEO, appointed directors may be perceived as being lax monitors of the actions 
of the CEO. This may lead to skepticism regarding the effectiveness of their role in the corporate governance 
process, especially following financial misconduct. As a consequence, appointed board members may be more 
concerned than nonappointed board members about damage to their own reputation in the eyes of stakeholders, 
owners, and the public following the disclosure of financial misconduct. Given that appointed board members 
may be viewed as having been too beholden to the CEO, they may be more likely to be discredited following 
financial misconduct.  
Following financial misconduct, pressure on board members may alter the effect of board loyalty on chief 
executive replacement. Cowen and Marcel (2011) demonstrated how firms could become especially concerned 
about negative reputational effects occurring as the result of their own board members being affiliated with firms 
that had been forced to restate their earnings. In their study, firms that did not commit financial misconduct 
themselves, but only shared directors with a restating firm, were concerned about how their legitimacy might be 
perceived by their stakeholders due to ties to these “reputationally‐damaged” board members and were found to 
be more likely to dismiss compromised board members (Cowen and Marcel, 2011).  
To the extent that board members are perceived as being more closely affiliated with the CEO, outside observers 
are more likely to evaluate them similarly, and there is likely to be a greater degree of stigma by association for 
appointed directors as compared to nonappointed directors. CEO‐appointed directors in restating firms may 
consequently have greater motivation following a misconduct to distance themselves from the CEO and reduce 
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this stigma by association (Goffman, 1963; Link and Phelan, 2001; Semadeni et al., 2008). Threats of stigma by 
association may lead appointed directors to decrease their support for the CEO more dramatically than 
nonappointed directors, especially considering that the latter are usually more likely to critically assess the CEO. 
This more dramatic shift in the support of appointed board members may lead to a greater relative decrease in 
support for the CEO in firms with boards composed of a greater proportion of appointed directors. As a result, 
while support for the CEO is likely to decline for all board members following financial misrepresentation, the 
change is argued to be greater for appointed members. Given the reduced motivation of appointed board members 
to help the CEO under such conditions, we argue that the influence of appointed board members should weaken 
following financial misconduct.  
Hypothesis 1: Financial misconduct by the firm weakens the tendency of board members appointed by the 
incumbent CEO to reduce the probability of CEO replacement. 
Inside board members and CEO replacement 
Similar to the case of CEO‐appointed board members, inside board members may also be seen as providing less 
active oversight and monitoring. Given that stakeholders, owners, and the public may perceive inside directors as 
being less effective at monitoring and governing the firm than outside directors—especially following the 
disclosure of financial misrepresentation—these directors may believe that distancing themselves from the CEO 
may limit the adverse effects of stigma by association (Goffman, 1963). Given the occurrence of financial 
misconduct, which may be seen as more intentional and purposeful, inside board members may find it especially 
difficult to defend the CEO, and may also be less able or motivated to do so.  
Contestation 
Contestation of the position of the CEO by inside board members may also be more likely in cases where 
financial misconduct has occurred. The contestation argument (Ocasio, 1994; Ocasio and Kim, 1999; Ridge, 
Aime, and White, 2014) portrays firm elites as consisting of political coalitions that may shift when crises emerge 
(Putnam, 1976; Ridge et al., 2014; Selznick, 1957). In such cases, inside board members may contest the position 
of the chief executive since they comprise a prominent and likely pool of possible successors (Greve and 
Mitsuhashi, 2007; Joseph, Ocasio, and McDonnell, 2014; Shen and Cannella, 2002). To the extent that inside 
board members consider themselves potentially well‐positioned successors to the CEO, they may be more prone 
to critically appraise and critique the actions of the CEO following the revelation of financial misconduct. Under 
such conditions, the incentive of inside board members to distance themselves from the CEO, along with the 
possibility that they will contest the CEO's position, may weaken the typically negative relationship between the 
presence of inside board members and CEO replacement. This decrease in support for CEO by inside directors 
should also be greater than that of outside directors, who are likely to be more vigilant to begin with. As such, 
following financial misconduct, CEO support should experience a greater relative decline in firms with a greater 
proportion of inside directors.  
Hypothesis 2: Financial misconduct by the firm weakens the tendency of inside board members to reduce the 
probability of CEO replacement. 
Effects of board characteristics following the Sarbanes‐Oxley Act 
High‐profile accounting scandals at Enron, WorldCom, and other corporations sparked public concern about 
managerial misdeeds and lax board oversight, leading to the passage of the Sarbanes‐Oxley Act of 2002. The 
purpose of SOX is to minimize the occurrence of financial fraud that might jeopardize the interests of investors. 
Specifically, SOX aims to achieve this by, among others, redefining the duties and requirements of the firm's 
board as well as their compensation, audit and nominating committees (Klein, 2003). For example, Section 404 
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requires greater transparency in financial reporting and strong internal corporate governance to prevent any 
occurrence of fraud. Section 807 in SOX also enables regulators to file criminal charges against any individual 
who defrauds or attempts to defraud shareholders of publicly traded companies. As a result, SOX has created 
greater clarity around expectations for honest and unbiased disclosure of the financial condition of the firm and 
expectations for sound and effective corporate monitoring and governance by the board of directors.  
As Wintoki (2007) argued, the provisions in SOX and the new exchange regulations go beyond just specifying the 
number of outside and inside directors; they impose a much higher level of director monitoring on all firms. 
Under these requirements, the audit committee must meet with auditors separately from managers and firms must 
have fully independent nominating and compensation committees (Coates, 2007). Linck, Netter, and Yang (2009) 
found that SOX led to broad‐based changes in the roles of boards of directors, with post‐SOX boards larger and 
more independent. They also found that board committees met more often post‐SOX and directors were more 
likely to be lawyers/consultants, financial experts, and retired executives, and less likely to be current executives.  
Given these provisions of SOX, we argue that it exerts an effect similar to that of a restatement, though one that 
results from the passage of a jurisdiction‐wide institutional change rather than a firm‐specific event (such as a 
restatement). The focus of SOX on effective corporate governance likely increases the level of concern and 
scrutiny directed at boards, whose monitoring and oversight may be perceived as inadequate. Further, as 
provisions within Sarbanes‐Oxley emphasize expectations for sound corporate governance, the ability of 
appointed or inside board members to craft credible arguments that excuse or shift blame from the CEO weakens, 
making it more difficult to defend the CEO. Following the passage of SOX, appointed or inside directors—
already perceived as being less vigilant—will be under even greater scrutiny related to the effectiveness of their 
monitoring and oversight roles (Goranova and Ryan, 2014; Hillman et al., 2011).  
If appointed and inside board members perceive that their reputation is threatened, then SOX may alter the 
relationship between these board members and their CEO. Given that SOX increases both stakeholders' 
expectations of sound corporate governance and the penalty of failing to do so, it may cause these board members 
to be more cognizant of the ways their reputation might be affected. Accordingly, inside and appointed board 
members may be less likely to defend the CEO following the passage of SOX. Thus, although SOX is a 
jurisdiction‐wide and not firm‐specific change, we posit that it also weakens the likelihood that inside or 
appointed board members would reduce CEO replacement. This weakening effect should be more visible when 
the inside or appointed directors are present in a greater proportion.  
Hypothesis 3: The passage of SOX weakens the tendency of board members appointed by the CEO to reduce the 
probability of CEO replacement. 
Hypothesis 4: The passage of SOX weakens the tendency of inside board members to reduce the probability of 
CEO replacement. 
 
METHODS 
Data 
Following past literature that examines financial misrepresentation, we focus on restatements that involved the 
disclosure of earnings manipulation (Arthaud‐Day et al., 2006; Harris and Bromiley, 2007; Hennes, Leone, and 
Miller, 2008). These restatements are reported by the U.S. Government Accountability Office (U.S. GAO, 2002, 
2006), and include restatements that are due to earning manipulations (e.g., misuse of facts, deliberate 
misinterpretation of accounting rules, or fraud as broadly defined by GAO), and not normal corporate activity or 
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accounting policy changes. To ensure that we examine cases that are serious enough to lead to stigmatization, and 
similar to past work in this area, we focus specifically on restatements that are related to revenue and expense 
recognitions, which are open to subjective accruals by managers and more likely to be manipulated, and that are 
downward revisions of previously inflated earnings (Collins et al., 2009; Kinney and McDaniel, 1989; Palmrose, 
Richardson, and Scholz, 2004). We excluded non‐U.S.‐based firms to avoid any differences in cultural or 
financial reporting requirements (Pfarrer et al., 2008a). We also excluded firms that restated more than once to 
avoid any confounding issues resulting from multiple restatements. We divided the time frame in which we 
examined the restatements into two periods, before and after the enactment of Sarbanes‐Oxley Act on July 30, 
2002. Our data started in 1995 since that was the earliest date that information was available through the SEC 
online website. Our data collection continued until June 2006, when the GAO ended its data collection, giving us 
four years of post‐SOX data.  
As explained in the measure for our dependent variable below, we excluded firms where the CEO succession 
event could not count as replacement due to merger or acquisition or other stated reasons. Following this 
exclusion and as the number of restatement cases increases over time, our final sample consisted of 500 
restatement cases with 35 percent being pre‐SOX data (176 restating firms before SOX out of 500) and 65 percent 
post‐SOX data (324 restating firms after SOX out of 500).1 
Matched sample 
To control for potential endogeneity, we employed a matched‐pair sampling design that serves as a quasi‐
experiment and is particularly suitable for examining phenomena with a low base rate of occurrence, as in the 
case of restatements (c.f. Arthaud‐Day et al., 2006; Harris and Bromiley, 2007). Similar to other studies of 
restatement events (e.g., Agrawal et al., 1999; Arthaud‐Day et al., 2006; Kinney, Palmrose, and Scholz, 2004; 
Richardson, Tuna, and Wu, 2003), we matched each restating firm with a firm that did not issue any restatement. 
We identified matching firms from the same four‐digit SIC code, the same time period, and with similar total 
asset size. To further ensure equivalency, we tested the similarity of the two groups in terms of asset, revenue, 
stockholders' equity, net income, and return on assets. We found no statistically significant difference between the 
groups on any of these dimensions. Therefore, we are confident that our procedure yielded appropriate matches. 
After a similar exclusion for the CEO successions that could not count as replacement, we ended up with 481 
matching or nonrestating firms with a breakdown that is virtually identical to that for the restating firms: 
37 percent pre‐SOX data (180 nonrestating cases before SOX out of 481) and 63 percent post‐SOX data (301 
nonrestating cases after SOX out of 481). In total, we have 981 observations (500 restating firms and 481 
matching firms) with 51 percent being restatement cases (500 out of 981) and 49 percent nonrestatement ones 
(481 out of 981). In terms of the pre‐ and post‐SOX observation periods, we have 36 percent pre‐SOX cases (356 
out of 981 with 176 being restating firms and 180 being matching firms) and 64 percent post‐SOX cases (625 out 
of 981 with 324 restating and 301 matching). All these observations are before any list‐wise deletion that results 
in a slightly smaller final sample, which is indicated in the regression tables.  
Measures 
Dependent variable 
The dependent variable in all hypotheses is CEO replacement. We measured this variable at two points in time, 
within both one and two years of the restatement, and operationalized it as a binary variable with a value of 1 
when the incumbent CEO is replaced within this time frame and 0 otherwise. To ensure that we focused on cases 
where the CEO was replaced and did not retire or move onto the board, we carefully examined each occurrence of 
                                                          
1 Past studies have indicated that finding a statistically significant moderating effect using an unbalanced sample is more 
difficult than using a balanced sample (Aguinis, 1995; Aguinis et al., 2005), making our results conservative. 
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CEO replacement using several sources. First, we downloaded news from Lexis‐Nexis pertaining to the focal firm 
from one year prior to the year of the CEO succession event to one year after the year of the CEO succession 
event. This three‐year window allows us to capture more comprehensively any news pertaining to the CEO's 
replacement. We also examined SEC filings in which the succession of the CEO was mentioned. Second, 
following past studies (Finkelstein et al., 2009; Shen and Cannella, 2002), we removed any cases in which the 
CEO departure was characterized as having resulted from death, health issues, from taking up a CEO position in 
another firm, or if the CEO was an interim CEO in the first place. Following past studies, we also excluded cases 
in which the succession was a result of a long‐term plan for a retirement or when the CEO continued to stay in the 
firm, typically as chairman as such an event reflects a lingering presence of the CEO and does not represent a 
purposeful replacement (Finkelstein et al., 2009). Finally, while some of the replacements were preceded by 
mentions of poor performance, we did not restrict our sample of replacements to only those firms experiencing 
poor performance since past studies have shown that even high‐performing firms commit financial misconduct 
and replace their CEOs (Harris and Bromiley, 2007; Mishina et al., 2010). Altogether, we are confident that our 
careful analyses captured relevant CEO replacements.  
Independent variables 
We measured Restatement using a binary variable that takes the value of 1 if a firm restates and 0 otherwise. 
Proportion of inside board members was measured as the proportion of non‐CEO board members who are also 
executives of the firm. Proportion of board appointed by CEO was the proportion of board members appointed 
after the focal CEO was elected to the chief executive position. We operationalized the effect of SOX, “Post‐
SOX,” using a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 for the period after the passage of Sarbanes‐Oxley Act on 
July 30, 2002.  
Control variables 
We also included a number of control variables in our models that potentially influence the effect of restatement 
and proportion of board members on CEO replacement. All these variables are measured in the year of 
restatement (or the year of the match for the nonrestating firms). Firm age was measured since founding while 
firm size was measured using firm revenue. We controlled for temporal variation by including year dummies with 
1995 as the reference year. We controlled for firms' prior performance using return on asset (ROA) in the year of 
the restatement. Board characteristics such as board size and average board tenure were also controlled for. We 
controlled for the number of business segments a firm operates in as it might indicate CEO power. CEO equity 
was also controlled using the proportion of firm equity held by the CEO, while CEO duality using a binary 
variable that takes the value of 1 when the CEO is also the Chairman of the Board and 0 otherwise.  
A restatement might also cause the departure of inside board members, outside board members, and audit board 
members (Arthaud‐Day et al., 2006; Marcel and Cowen, 2014). As these departures might provide an opportunity 
for scapegoating and could influence CEO replacement, we also controlled for these events. Following Arthaud‐
Day et al. (2006), we included three dummy variables for replacement of outside directors, replacement of inside 
directors, and replacement of audit committee members, each of which takes the value of 1 when there is a 
replacement of the respective board members between the restatement date and the CEO replacement, and 0 
otherwise. As a robustness check, we also measured these variables using the actual count of how many of each 
type of board members were replaced. Finally, to control for the possibility that some blame for the restatement 
might be attributed to the CFO (Arthaud‐Day et al., 2006), we controlled for whether the CFO is replaced 
(replacement of CFO) following a restatement and included this covariate as a control.  
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Model and estimation 
As our dependent variable, CEO replacement, is dichotomous, we estimated our models using logistic regression 
where the probability of CEO replacement (Y = 1) or nonreplacement (Y = 0) is predicted by the covariates, X, 
through the following relationship where β is the column vector containing the estimated regression coefficients 
(Cohen et al., 2002):  
 
To reduce skewness and kurtosis, we log‐transformed some variables (Cohen et al., 2002). To check for potential 
multicollinearity, we calculated the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) among the explanatory variables, which was 
less than 10 (Cohen et al., 2002), and conditional index, which is less than 30 (Belsley, 1991).2 In all regressions, 
we used robust standard error to minimize problems of heteroscedasticity. All analyses were done using Stata 
version 11. 
 
RESULTS 
In Table 1, we report the descriptive statistics for all the variables of interest. Several variables were mean‐
centered and/or logged to reduce potential multicollinearity (Cohen et al., 2002); these transformed variables are 
noted in the table. For ease of exposition, the means and standard deviations of all variables are shown in their 
original metrics, prior to any transformations. After excluding cases where the CEO succession event did not 
count as replacement, we have a total of 981 observations. In the multivariate regressions, another 10 percent of 
the observations were dropped due to list‐wise deletion.  
To test the hypotheses, we begin by reporting the regression results in Table 2. As a CEO replacement can take 
place within one or two years from a restatement, Table 2 reports the findings across both windows with Models 
1–3 reporting results where the CEO was replaced within one year from the restatement, and Models 4–6 for 
when replacement occurred within two years. Model 1 includes only the control variables. Model 2 introduces the 
main effect of restatement, SOX, and the proportion of inside and appointed directors. Model 3 adds all the 
interactions between the proportion of inside and appointed directors and restatement or SOX. We repeat this in 
Models 4–6, where Model 4 introduces only the controls, Model 5 adds the main effects, and Model 6 the 
interaction effects.  
 
  
                                                          
2 Stata automatically drops any variable that cause serious multi-collinearity. None of the variables we entered were dropped 
by Stata. 
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics  
 
 
a Variable is logged.  
b Divided by 106.  
Means and standard deviations are reported in the original metric; correlations whose absolute values are greater than 0.07 are 
significant at p < 0.05.  
Except for binary variables, all variables are mean‐centered. 
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Table 2. Moderating effect of restatement and SOX (logistics regression)  
 
*** p < 0.001; ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05; +p < 0.1 Standard errors in parentheses. 
Across all of the models, we found that our control variables essentially confirmed past findings. Restatement 
significantly increases the probability of CEO replacement (Arthaud‐Day et al., 2006). The replacement of outside 
directors, audit committee members, and the CFO also increases the probability of CEO replacement. Firms with 
higher return on asset were less likely to replace their CEOs. Board tenure and CEO duality also decreased the 
probability of CEO replacement in some models, and year effects are significant in some cases, although no 
discernible trend was observed.  
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Hypothesis 1 predicted that financial misconduct by the firm would weaken the tendency of board members 
appointed by the incumbent CEO to reduce the probability of CEO replacement. While Model 3 indicates no 
significant effect on CEO replacement in the first year, Model 6 demonstrates marginal support for Hypothesis 1 
for CEO replacement within two years of restatement. While the main effect of having a greater proportion of 
appointed directors reduces CEO replacement (β = ‐0.26, p < 0.001), confirming past studies on the effects of 
appointed directors, this effect is weakened in the case of restating firms (β = 0.13, p < 0.10) – although the 
interaction effect plot in Figure 1(a) later shows that this effect is significant at least at p < 0.05 for many firms 
(more below). These findings indicate that the negative effect of appointed boards on CEO replacement is 
weakened, as hypothesized, when the firm has suffered a reputation‐damaging event such as a financial 
restatement.  
 
Figure 1 Interaction effect: (a) Appointed directors × restatement. (b) Inside directors × restatement.  
(c) Appointed directors × SOX. (d) Inside directors × SOX  
Hypothesis 2 predicted that financial misconduct by the firm would weaken the tendency of inside board 
members to reduce the probability of CEO replacement. This hypothesis is supported in Model 3, which 
demonstrates that, while the main effect of having proportionally more inside directors generally reduces CEO 
replacement (β = ‐0.25, p < 0.05), this effect is weakened in the case of restating firms (β = 0.29, p < 0.01). In this 
case, this effect seems more salient in Model 3 (representing one year after the restatement), rather than two years 
following the restatement, as reported in Model 6.  
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Hypothesis 3 predicted that the passage of SOX would weaken the tendency of board members appointed by the 
CEO to reduce CEO replacement. Our results in Models 3 and 6 demonstrate support for these hypotheses, 
(β = 0.26, p < 0.01 in Model 3 and β = 0.11, p < 0.1 in Model 6). Likewise, Hypothesis 4 predicted that the passage 
of SOX would weaken the tendency of inside board members to reduce CEO replacement. Results in Model 6 
confirms that the effect is weakened as demonstrated by the positive interaction between proportion of inside 
board members and SOX (β = 0.15, p < 0.05). Overall, our hypotheses receive broad supports across the different 
models.  
Given that the interaction effect in a logistic model could depend on not only the coefficient of the interaction 
terms, but also on the coefficients and values of other variables (Hoetker, 2007; Wiersema and Bowen, 2009), we 
also calculated interaction effects by plotting the effect along with the associated z‐statistics in Figure 1 based on 
the significant interactions in the full models. To conserve space, we present Figure 1 as a table that includes 
several figures depending on the interaction effect being examined. Each figure has two vertical y‐axes. The y‐
axis on the left hand side indicates whether or not the interaction effect is indeed positive, while the y‐axis on the 
center hand side whether or not the effect is significant. To facilitate interpretation, we draw horizontal lines that 
indicates the two‐sided 95 percent confidence interval (z‐statistic = ±1.96). Any z‐statistics (indicated by hollow 
triangles) above the upper horizontal line (z‐statistic = +1.96) suggest a two‐sided 95 percent‐level significance for 
a particular observation. The x‐axis denotes the range of our observations. These graphs provide answers to two 
questions around our findings: (1) Do the firms in our sample demonstrate a positive moderating effect of 
restatement or SOX, as denoted by the circles? and (2) Is the interaction effect significant as represented by the 
triangles? Overall, most of the firms in the sample demonstrated positive interaction effects that are significant. 
We discuss these in more detail below.  
Figure 1(a) depicts the interaction between the proportion of appointed directors and restatement. Here, the 
interactions remain positive and significant especially in the second half of the outcome range, that is, when the 
probability of CEO replacement is greater than 0.6. Figure 1(b) plots the interaction between proportion of inside 
directors and restatement. As can be seen, the majority of the cases lie above the upper limit of the confidence 
interval (z‐statistic >+1.96) and the interaction effects are indeed positive as indicated by the left y‐axis.  
Figure 1(c) plots the interaction between proportion of appointed directors and SOX. Almost all of the cases lie 
above the upper limit of the confidence interval and the interaction effects are positive. The interaction between 
the proportion of inside directors and SOX is shown in Figure 1(d), where the interactions are positive and 
significant across practically the whole entire range of observations. Altogether, the plots of these interaction 
effects graphically illustrate support for the conclusions of our regression results at least at p < 0.05, providing 
further support for our hypotheses.  
Finally, we also plot how the probability of CEO replacement changes across different values of the proportion of 
inside or appointed directors contingent on the corresponding moderating variables, restatement or SOX. Figure 2 
illustrates that for a nonrestating firm, a board consisting of a greater proportion of appointed board members 
decreases the probability of CEO replacement by 80 percent (from 0.23 to 0.05) as the proportion of appointed 
directors changes from 2 standard deviations below the mean to 2 standard deviations above. However, following 
a restatement, the decrease becomes much more modest, dropping only 28 percent (from 0.32 to 0.23). Similarly, 
Figure 3 depicts the interaction between the proportion of inside directors and restatement. As can be seen, for a 
nonrestating firm, having more inside board members helps reduce the probability of CEO replacement. However, 
in cases where the firm has restated its earnings, the effects of insiders is actually the opposite, increasing the 
probability of CEO replacement. Both plots support the counterintuitive notion that firms with a greater 
proportion of inside or appointed directors will have weaker tendency to support the CEO, if not the opposite, 
following financial misconduct.  
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Figures 4 and 5 show the moderating effect of SOX on these board structures. Figure 4 indicates that having a 
greater proportion of appointed board members substantially reduces CEO replacement before SOX (the 
probability decreases from 0.40 to 0.05 over a ±2 SD range), but this change practically disappears following 
SOX. In Figure 5, a greater proportion of inside directors decreases the probability of CEO replacement before 
SOX while actually increasing it after SOX, with SOX having a negative main effect on the probability of CEO 
replacement. Altogether, Figures 2-5, combined with our regression results and interaction effect plots in Figure 
1(a–d), demonstrate broad and consistent support for our hypotheses that while the presence of inside and 
appointed board members generally decreases the probability of CEO replacement, their effects weaken and even 
reverse following a restatement and the passage of SOX.  
Robustness checks 
We further examined and confirmed the consistency of our findings through a number of additional robustness 
checks. First, we measured board replacement using the actual count of how many outside board, inside board, 
and audit committee members were being replaced, with our results remaining consistent. Second, to further 
examine whether the change in the effects of board members' characteristics is moderated by SOX, we calculated 
pair‐wise correlation between the proportion of inside and appointed board members and CEO replacement 
during the first half of 2002 (before the passage of SOX on July 30, 2002), and during the second half of 2002 
(after the passage of SOX). Our results demonstrated that this pair‐wise correlation was negative for the first half 
with correlations ranging from ‐0.16 to ‐0.23, depending on whether the board was examined in terms of its 
proportion of inside or appointed members and whether the replacement was measured one or two years after 
restatement. Our findings indicate that boards with a greater proportion of inside and appointed members 
decreases CEO replacement before SOX, while increasing it after SOX with correlations ranging from 0.02 to 
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0.19. Such a demonstrated step‐function change further corroborates our earlier analyses and demonstrates that 
the moderating effect of SOX does indeed reflect a change driven by the passage of SOX and not by other 
changes in the environment.  
Third, we examined the effect of a number of potential control variables not included in our earlier models: (1) As 
the Audit Committee plays a central role in ensuring proper monitoring of firm financial statements, we examined 
whether or not the presence of insiders, especially the CEO, in the audit committee could influence the dynamics 
between the board and the CEO replacement. We collected data on whether or not the CEO sits in the audit 
committee as well as the number of insiders who sit in the audit committee. (2) We examined whether the 
external auditor was from any of the large public accounting firms during this period,3 and whether or not the 
external auditors from the restatement year were replaced in the following one or two years. (3) Since ownership 
characteristics might influence board dynamics and the probability of CEO replacement, we also controlled for 
the percentage of equity owned by the blockholders (entities that own more than 5% of shares), and the 
percentage owned by institutional investors, both of whom are more likely to operate independently of CEO 
pressure (Kang, 2008; Marcel and Cowen, 2014). Finally, (4) we examined whether or not a CEO sits in the 
nomination committee, where his or her involvement might further influence the extent of board members' 
actions, their degree of stigmatization, and their incentive to replace the CEO.  
We then entered these additional controls (CEO presence in the audit committee, number of insiders in the audit 
committee, public accounting firm background of the external auditor, replacement of external auditor, percentage 
of equity owned by blockholders, percentage owned by institutional investors, and CEO presence in the 
nomination committee) into our earlier models. Our results demonstrated that none of our earlier conclusions 
changed. CEO presence in the nomination committee was highly collinear with the other variables and was 
dropped automatically by the Stata program when entered together. None of the remaining additional controls 
significantly influenced CEO replacement with the exception of institutional equity ownership, which marginally 
(p < 0.10) demonstrated a positive effect on CEO replacement two years after the restatement. Given their lack of 
significance and for the sake of parsimony, we did not include these additional controls in our reported results.  
Next, since our dependent variable, CEO replacement, may take place after we end our observation (i.e., be center 
censored), we estimated our models using continuous‐time event history analysis that can account for center 
censoring. In this estimation model, we analyzed one observation per subject (Cleves et al., 2008), and predicted 
the effect of board structure at the time of restatement (along with other covariates and moderators) on the 
likelihood of CEO replacement. We chose a proportional hazard rate model that uses Weibull parametric 
specification since this model yielded the lowest AIC for our data and thus suggests the best fit.4 This event 
history analysis requires information about when the CEO replacement occurs. We obtained this fine‐grained data 
by measuring the length of time between the dates of restatement and CEO replacement. Nonreplacements are 
treated as censored observations. The results show that our conclusion remains supported with this alternative 
estimation model (the results are available in Appendix S1).  
Additionally, it is possible that the proportion of inside or appointed directors, restatement, and CEO replacement 
may be related through a different causal mechanism. Specifically, it might be argued that firms with a greater 
proportion of inside or appointed directors are more likely to commit a restatement, in turn, leading to a higher 
                                                          
3 In our sample, large public accounting firms consist of ArthurAndersen, BDO International, Deloitte & Touche, Ernst & 
Young,KPMG, and PricewaterhouseCoopers. 
4 This parametric model is theoretically more efficient than a semi‐parametric model, such as the Cox model in utilizing 
information (Allison, 1984; Cleves et al., 2008; Cox, 1972). Also, it yielded a lower Akaike Information Criterion (AIC), that 
is, it provided a better goodness of fit for our data when compared to other models, including the Cox model. This Weibull 
model gives comparable AIC to the Gompertz model, which yields similar results. We also ran separate analyses using the 
nonparametric Cox model (1972) that yielded similar conclusions. 
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likelihood of CEO replacement. We believe this alternative mechanism is less likely for a number of reasons. 
First, if our results are due to unobserved factors or endogeneity, then this concern has been minimized by our use 
of matching firms and a quasi‐experimental setting. Second, these alternative explanations would require a 
positive relationship between the proportion of inside or appointed directors and restatement. We show no 
evidence of this in our sample, which indicates that the correlation between the proportion of inside and appointed 
directors and restatement is not significant (p > 0.1). Additionally, using the Kolmogorov‐Smirnov (KS) two‐
sample equality of distribution test, the distribution of these directors across the restating and matching firms does 
not differ significantly. Altogether, our data show no significant indication that more insiders or appointed 
directors necessarily lead to a higher probability of restatement.  
We also examined past studies to see if the proportion of inside or appointed directors had been shown to 
influence the probability of restatement. Harris and Bromiley (2007) showed in their robustness tests that board 
independence did not significantly influence the probability of restatement. In a related vein, Mishina et al. (2010) 
demonstrated that the proportion of outsiders on the board did not significantly predict the probability of the firm 
committing corporate illegality, such as environmental violations, anticompetitive actions, false claims, and fraud. 
In sum, past studies have not indicated any support for the relationship between independent directors and 
reputation‐damaging actions, such as financial misconduct.5 
Additional analyses 
Further, while the categorization between the restating and matching firms allow us to distinguish the level of 
scrutiny or perceived scrutiny that is directed toward the directors, we further extend this measure by calculating 
the severity of the restatement among the restating firms. We measure the severity of the restatement as the total 
decrease in net income of the focal firm following restatement divided by the firm revenue for the year prior to the 
restatement announcement. We then entered this continuous severity measure in lieu of the restatement dummy, 
that is, each restating firm is assigned its severity measure while the nonrestating firm by definition is assigned a 
value of 0. We then ran the previous analyses using this measure and all our conclusions remain supported.  
Finally, we also examine the potential interaction between restatement and the passage of SOX. We found that 
committing a restatement following SOX increases CEO replacement and that this effect is mostly felt within 
one year after a restatement. While this particular interaction does not involve board characteristics, which is the 
main focus of this study, this finding indicates the higher penalty that SOX imposes upon financial misconduct.  
Overall, our hypotheses receive broad and consistent supports after various robustness checks and analyses, 
demonstrating that while the presence of inside and appointed board members generally decreases CEO 
replacement, their effects weaken and can even reverse following a restatement and the passage of SOX.  
 
DISCUSSION 
The primary objective of this research was to understand how key aspects of the governance process, including 
board affiliation and regulatory intervention, influence the probability of chief executive replacement following a 
reputation‐damaging event and a change in institutional regulation. We found that inside and appointed board 
members decrease their support for the CEO to a greater extent than other directors following financial 
misconduct by the firm. Similarly, we found that the passage of SOX lessened the tendency of inside and 
appointed board members to reduce the probability of CEO replacement. The perception of weaker corporate 
governance in firms with a greater proportion of such board members appears to be exacerbated following SOX. 
                                                          
5 We thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting that we examine this potential alternative mechanism. 
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Importantly, our results also provide supports for the more established view that having more appointed and 
inside board members reduce the probability of CEO replacement in cases other than restatement and prior to 
SOX.  
Our findings demonstrate how our existing understanding of the relationship between nonindependent board 
members (appointed and insiders) and the chief executive may not hold in certain contexts. A key contribution of 
this study to the corporate governance literature is in highlighting and reinforcing the growing notion that there is 
no universal model for corporate governance; rather, the choice and effect of different aspects of corporate 
governance is contingent upon a number of factors both internal and external to the organization. This 
contextualized interpretation of corporate governance is also in line with the notion that the study of corporate 
governance needs to move more towards an open systems logic, giving greater attention to the broader 
environmental context, such as the regulatory environment examined here (Desender et al., 2013, 2014). By 
utilizing financial misconduct as a stigmatizing event and SOX as a change in regulatory norms, our findings 
demonstrate that CEOs who may have accumulated greater power and influence through board appointments or 
by having insiders serving on the board may face weaker support when the reputation of these directors is 
questioned. These findings provide an interesting extension to the intuitive notion established in past research that 
inside or appointed directors are more likely to protect the CEO from threat of replacement under most 
circumstances (Deutsch, 2005). More importantly, these insights help us better understand the complex set of 
factors surrounding corporate governance as a function of multiple, interrelated sets of actors and institutions, 
which goes beyond a simple dichotomy such as outsider versus insider.  
Relatedly, this study also responds to and reinforces recent call to investigate the role of corporate governance 
following a financial crisis (Aguilera and Jackson, 2010). Our findings underscore how CEOs with more inside 
and appointed board members on their boards may, ironically, suffer from the presence of these individuals. Past 
work has shown evidence that negative information is more salient and has a stronger effect than positive 
information and is perceived by others to be more accurate and diagnostic (Rozin and Royzman, 2001). In our 
setting, a negative event, such as financial misrepresentation, is likely to draw increased attention to those in the 
organization seen as responsible for its occurrence. These findings also highlight some of the potentially negative 
effects of social ties and affiliations. Most past work on social outcomes of affiliations has highlighted the 
positive aspects of connections to powerful others by signaling status and contributing to the focal individual's 
social capital (Burt, 2011). Conversely, this research illustrates a context where the negative effects of affiliation 
may become salient through the mechanisms of a formal role, that is, board membership.  
These results extend past work that has demonstrated that the status of the stigmatized individual can magnify the 
effects of stigma by association (Pontikes et al., 2010), so that individuals who occupy higher status positions 
attract more attention and represent more salient targets, thus amplifying the effects of stigma by association 
(Kulik et al., 2008). The dominant position of inside and appointed board members may create a perception to 
external stakeholders that the firm's governance structure is relatively weak, and the occurrence of a restatement is 
likely to further reinforce this view, creating greater pressure from investors and other stakeholders to replace the 
CEO. By demonstrating how the CEO, who is likely powerful and influential, can actually become more likely to 
be replaced, our findings illustrate an interesting and countervailing effect of that influence following a 
reputation‐damaging event.  
The effect of a regulatory intervention such as SOX provides further support for our argument that the effects of 
board composition on CEO replacement depend on the potential loss of legitimacy that the firm and the board 
face. The moderating effect of SOX suggests that the relationship between inside or appointed directors and CEO 
replacement might be more complex than merely the balance of power between the CEO and the board. The 
passage of SOX, as a natural experiment, highlights the effects of an institutional change on board members' 
behaviors, especially on those of appointed directors who have little or no incentive to contest the CEO. These 
results highlight some critical limitations of agency arguments while also introducing a more behaviorally 
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oriented perspective on corporate governance and board legitimacy, especially on the role of institutions in which 
actors are socially situated (Pfarrer et al., 2008b; Westphal and Zajac, 2013; Withers et al., 2012).  
A critical limitation to our study is the generalizability of our findings to other institutional environments outside 
the United States. Different governance and policy structures could moderate the power dynamics between the 
CEO and the board. In countries such as Germany, in which other stakeholder groups are represented on the board 
(Fiss and Zajac, 2004), the board may be much more effective at disciplining the CEO. Also, while a financial 
misrepresentation is likely to cause stigma—and indeed our findings support this notion—like past studies, we did 
not directly measure that stigma had occurred (Hebl and Mannix, 2003).  
Future research into financial malfeasance and managerial replacement should continue to investigate the primary 
question of who controls the succession process. The results of this study go beyond past research that has shown 
chief executive replacement to be a political process; instead, we draw attention to the concerns of board members 
to appear desirable, proper, or appropriate, which may result in inside and appointed board members 
demonstrating less support for the CEO. Outcomes around firm performance and shareholder wealth have already 
led to a severe restructuring of governance and oversight following the Sarbanes‐Oxley Act. We hope this study 
spurs future research to focus on better understanding the interaction between organizational influence and 
legitimacy in firm actions.  
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Appendix S1. Moderating effect of restatement and SOX (event history analyses) 
  DV = + 1 year DV = + 2 years 
Covariates Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
       
Firm age -0.00 -0.00 -0.01 -0.08 0.08 0.07 
 
(0.13) (0.12) (0.13) (0.09) (0.10) (0.10) 
Firm size -0.04 -0.02 -0.02 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 
 
(0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
ROA -2.32+ -2.56+ -4.09* -0.65 -1.83* -1.88* 
 
(1.56) (1.58) (1.85) (0.92) (0.97) (1.06) 
Board size -0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 
 
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Board tenure -0.00 -0.01 -0.03+ -0.03* -0.03* -0.04* 
 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Business segments -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 
 
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
CEO equity -0.07+ -0.03 -0.01 -0.04 -0.04 -0.02 
 
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) 
CEO duality -0.17 -0.10 -0.17 -0.16 -0.24+ -0.26+ 
 
(0.20) (0.21) (0.21) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) 
Replacement of outside directors 0.60** 0.57** 0.58** 0.38* 0.37* 0.40* 
 
(0.22) (0.22) (0.23) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) 
Replacement of inside directors -0.10 -0.15 -0.19 0.24+ 0.16 0.16 
 
(0.24) (0.25) (0.26) (0.16) (0.17) (0.17) 
Replacement of audit committee members 0.28+ 0.27+ 0.26 0.51** 0.41* 0.40* 
 
(0.21) (0.21) (0.21) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) 
Replacement of CFO 1.05*** 1.08*** 1.08*** 1.05*** 0.95*** 0.92*** 
 
(0.20) (0.21) (0.21) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) 
Restatement 1.42*** 1.37*** 1.66*** 
 
0.94*** 1.00*** 
 
(0.27) (0.27) (0.32) 
 
(0.18) (0.19) 
Proportion of directors appointed by CEO 
 
-0.08* -0.29*** 
 
-0.07* -0.22*** 
  
(0.04) (0.09) 
 
(0.03) (0.06) 
Proportion of inside directors 
 
-0.00 -0.27** 
 
0.03 -0.08 
  
(0.04) (0.11) 
 
(0.03) (0.07) 
SOX 
 
-1.13* -0.82+ 
 
-1.10* -0.94* 
  
(0.55) (0.57) 
 
(0.47) (0.48) 
Proportion of directors appointed by CEO x Restatement 
  
0.12+ 
  
0.12* 
   
(0.09) 
  
(0.07) 
Proportion of inside directors x Restatement 
  
0.27** 
  
0.04 
   
(0.11) 
  
(0.07) 
Proportion of directors appointed by CEO x SOX 
  
0.19** 
  
0.10+ 
   
(0.08) 
  
(0.06) 
Proportion of inside directors x SOX 
  
0.04 
  
0.11* 
   
(0.08) 
  
(0.06) 
Constant -8.30*** -8.32*** -8.80*** -7.83*** -8.11*** -8.26*** 
 
(0.79) (0.80) (0.82) (0.63) (0.63) (0.64) 
Year fixed effect Included Included Included Included Included Included 
       
Observations 881 881 881 881 881 881 
χ2 140.21*** 150.75*** 166.95*** 139.32*** 180.46*** 190.66*** 
Δχ2 
 
10.54* 26.74*** 
 
41.14*** 51.34*** 
ln(p) -0.15* -0.14+ -0.12+ -0.14* -0.11* -0.11+ 
  (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) 
Standard errors in parentheses 
      
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1 
       
 
